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ABSTRACT 
 
U.S. MULTINATIONALS ABROAD:  FDI DETERMINANTS 
IN THE GLOBAL FOOD SECTOR 
Brandon Charles Banner 
The following study assesses economic and political determinants of foreign 
direct investment by U.S. firms. Data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis at the U.S. 
Department of Commerce was used for total and food sector FDI for 35 countries from 
the years 2001-2008.  Using these data in three econometric models, the paper examines 
the effect on FDI of regional trade blocs as well as political factors such as labor and 
credit market regulations, and transfers and subsidies.  Finally, the thesis provides a 
comparison of each model on two dependent variables:  food sector and total FDI.  The 
study finds that management decision making for FDI differs for agribusiness firms 
compared to industry as a whole, especially with regards to the host country’s relative 
wages, language barriers, and membership in the Association of Southeast Asian 
Countries (ASEAN). 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In the years preceding WWII, the primary vehicle for international business was 
trade – cross border exporting and importing.  After WWII—in particular the 1960s—the 
multinational enterprise (MNE) began to grow in significance (Hosseini, 2005).  An 
MNE is a firm that conducts business in more than one country by physically locating 
itself in the countries in which it operates.  The distinction between an MNE and a solely 
domestic firm is that the MNEs operate businesses in more than one country. 
MNE can expand internationally either by purchasing an existing company in a 
host nation or starting a new subsidiary business based in that host country.  Such 
expansion, foreign direct investment (FDI), has become a centerpiece in international 
business and economics literature.  The trend towards global expansion by FDI has 
increased steadily over the past half century, and today trade flows are far outweighed by 
FDI activities. The increase in FDI has been accompanied by a vast collection of 
scholarly articles and data collection that attempt to explain the cause and consequences 
of this shift away from trade and towards investment. 
With developing countries establishing presence in the international business 
community, international agribusiness has become an important sector for FDI around the 
world.  From 1987 to 2000, cross-border acquisitions in the food sector increased over 
tenfold, from $4 billion to $50 billion (Herger, Kotsogiannis, & McCorriston, 2005). 
Over the past half century, there has been a significant liberalization of FDI 
policies in the developed world.  In the 1990s, developing and transitioning economies 
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began to follow suit by altering their political framework towards encouraging FDI as 
well (UN, 2003).  Once the political structure has been altered, however, the economic 
factors that determine the level of FDI inflows take hold.  In order for nations to attract 
FDI, they should understand the economic factors that influence FDI. 
Statement of Problem 
What are the determinants of US FDI in the global food industry, and how do they 
differ from FDI across all sectors? 
Hypotheses 
There are four hypotheses in this paper.  The first hypothesis tests the assumption 
that the variables tested in the literature will perform similarly in the models developed 
here.  The second and third hypotheses relate to new variables this paper adds to the 
common model, which are regional trade relationships and regulatory variables.  Finally, 
the fourth hypothesis addresses the difference between aggregate FDI (FDItot) and FDI in 
the food sector (FDIfood).  The four hypotheses are as follows: 
 
1. Countries’ gross domestic product (GDP) is positively correlated with the 
amount of inward FDI for that country.  Wage levels, tax rates, language 
differences, and physical distance between the United States and the host 
country are negatively correlated with FDI. 
 
2. A significant positive relationship exists between countries’ affiliation in 
regional trade agreements (RTA’s)1 and FDI, i.e., RTA’s facilitate FDI. 
 
                                                             
1
 These RTA’s include the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the European Union (EU), 
The Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) and the Association of Southeast Asian Countries 
(ASEAN).  
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3. A significant negative causal relationship exists between the target country’s 
credit and labor market regulations with FDI, while a positive relationship 
exists between countries’ level of transfers and subsidies they provide. 
 
4. Food sector and aggregate FDI
 
have different responses by independent 
variables. 
 
Rationale for Hypothesis 
The first hypothesis is in agreement with the large body of literature surrounding 
FDI determinants.  Factors such as market size, wages, physical distance, and language 
barriers have a strong theoretical backing as to their association with FDI.  A country’s 
affiliation with RTAs mainly contributes to its market size.  That is, if a firm invests in a 
country that is involved in a RTA, it will then have access to all the other countries 
affiliated with that RTA.  Hypothesis three addresses regulatory concerns associated with 
a host country.  Here the assumption is that firms are less likely to invest in highly 
regulated economies.  With regards to transfers and subsidies, however, a positive 
relationship is expected as firms will see opportunities to take advantage of those 
payments.  Finally, recognizing that agribusiness firms have different management 
concerns and motives, there should be some differences between FDI in the food sector 
versus FDI in general. 
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Objectives of Study 
1. To test the impact of the addition of government regulation, language 
differences, and involvement with regional trade agreements on aggregate and 
food sector FDI. 
 
2. To compare the impact of FDI determinants on food sector FDI and total FDI. 
Justification of Study 
Along with the general trend of increasing FDI over the past fifty years, MNEs 
are increasingly choosing to acquire pre-established firms in targeted nations rather than 
starting new businesses in those markets; in fact, this is especially true for developed 
country firms, where 90 percent of FDI is executed by acquisition.  However, developing 
and transition economies are increasingly seeing more cross-border M&A activity with a 
30 percent increase in the portion of FDI coming from M&A from 1980 to 2005 (Herger, 
Kotsogiannis, and McCorriston, 2005).  Although the past decade (2000 – 2010) has seen 
a decrease in FDI altogether, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UN, 2003) suggests that FDI is again on the rise and is predicted to reach record highs 
by 2013. 
Yet, the theory of FDI is still somewhat under-developed and under-tested.  The 
aim of this study is to add to the empirical body of FDI literature in order to add to the 
collective understanding of FDI by testing the theoretical FDI determinants.  This 
research can be beneficial to three main institutions:  the international business 
community, international trade policy makers, and academia. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
 
Literature on FDI has been accumulating since the early twentieth century.  In 
2009, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) defined FDI as business activity in which 
one investor or a group of investors are able to exercise control or a significant degree of 
influence over another entity that is a resident of a different economy.  Immediate direct 
investments exist when an investor owns enough equity to have 10 percent or more of the 
voting power in the direct investment enterprise. Conversely, trade – as opposed to FDI – 
occurs when a firm produces a product in their home economy and exports it to a foreign 
economy.  International businesses that solely participate in trade activity have little or no 
equity positions abroad, whereas firms who participate in FDI activity have long-term 
investments in one or more economies besides their home economy. 
The primary vehicle for international enterprise prior to WWII was trade; 
however, after WWII and especially in the 1960s, FDI increasingly became a more 
popular alternative to trade (Hosseini, 2005).  Up to that point, scholarly research in the 
burgeoning field of FDI was sparse; however, the wave of FDI in the 1960s was 
accompanied by a nearly simultaneous wave in theoretical and empirical research.  
Stemming from this work was a relatively young yet dominating subject for international 
business and economics.  As research continues, the depth of knowledge is increasing, 
and the empirical research is refining and reinforcing the theoretical underpinnings from 
which they stem. 
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This chapter provides a review of the relevant scholarship pertaining to 
determinants of FDI.  The first section covers the theoretical foundations of FDI, and the 
second section is a review of the empirical research in the field of FDI.  This literature 
review will only cover components of the theoretical and empirical literature that share a 
direct link to the empirical work of this paper. 
FDI Theoretical Foundations 
This section discusses theory explaining FDI, but is not intended to serve as an 
exhaustive survey of the entire body of literature. This theoretical overview follows the 
extensive work by Buckley and Casson (1985), which should be referred to for a more 
exhaustive overview of the theoretical foundations of FDI. 
The Hymer Model 
Hymer’s (1960) work is commonly referenced as the starting point for the modern 
theory of FDI and the multinational enterprise.  However, Buckley and Casson (1985) 
found traces of the theory in several earlier papers including Coase (1937), Kaldor 
(1937), Robinson (1931, 1934), Bain (1956), and Dunning (1958).  Nonetheless, Hymer’s 
(1960) dissertation at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology provided a clear new 
direction for future research regarding the international firm. 
Before Hymer (1960), research in international economics and business focused 
on the capital movements theory, which was borrowed from the closely related field of 
international trade flow.  The basis of the capital movements (also referred to as portfolio 
flows) theory is the interest rate.  Since interest rates differ by country, firms that 
participate in international business will sell their products in markets where interest rates 
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are higher than their home market offers.  The movement of capital towards economies 
with relatively high interest rates will cause the returns in those countries to decline 
towards equilibrium where all interest rates are equal.  At equilibrium, there will be no 
change in capital flows until another shock occurs that disrupts the interest rate in one or 
more of the countries. 
Buckley and Casson (1985) summarized Hymer’s (1960) work by pointing out 
two key features inconsistent with the neoclassical capital flows model and the FDI 
reality.  First, Hymer (1960) observed that multinational enterprises (MNE) investing 
abroad overwhelmingly finance their operations in the target country’s capital markets.  
This misses the capital flows theory because it claims MNE’s do not actually treat lower 
interest rates or capital costs as a competitive advantage.  Second, Hymer (1960) found 
certain countries had considerable FDI concentration, while others did not, with rates of 
return seeming to play no role in these observations. 
Ultimately, the distinction made by Hymer (1960) between FDI and capital flows 
was that MNE firms choose to make long term physical investments in the target 
countries even with disproportionately low comparative advantage to firms indigenous to 
the host country.  Barring special conditions, native firms had inherent advantages over 
international firms because they have a better understanding of their country and its 
markets, economic-, legal-, political-, and socio-economic-systems.  Additionally, foreign 
firms often faced discrimination by host country government, consumers, and suppliers.  
The sum of these adverse conditions generally results in considerable added costs for 
foreign investors and acts as a barrier-to-trade from one country to another.  Therefore, 
firms that choose to participate in FDI activity must have a compensating advantage to 
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offset such costs.  In other words, foreign firms would always be less efficient than 
domestic firms in a perfect market and thus, FDI would not exist.  This distinction moved 
FDI into the field of imperfect markets:  industrial organization. 
The Product Cycle Model 
The product cycle model originated in the work by Vernon (1966):  her theory 
addressed the process of FDI, mainly with regards to the logical progression of FDI by a 
firm in terms of likely target countries.  Broadly, the theory explains the path of 
internationalization for a product from its creation.  First, since developed countries have 
high disposable incomes, they are likely to be the country of origin for most new 
products.  As a new product grows in popularity in its home market, interest will be 
generated in other developed countries, which will give the producers incentive to export 
their products to those countries as well.  Eventually, firms indigenous to the importing 
country will begin producing substitute or imitation products, thus creating a competitive 
market in the non-origination country.  Since the indigenous firm has an advantage at 
home due primarily to the transfer costs associated with importing by the non-indigenous 
firms, the foreign firm is likely to invest directly in the target country.  This leads to the 
final stage of the cycle, where products become standardized, meaning products sell 
completely on the basis of price competition.  In this phase of the model, non-indigenous 
firms have incentives to invest in less-developed countries in order to utilize on relatively 
cheaper labor.  At this point, the full cycle has been realized. 
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The Knowledge-Capital Model 
Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001) presented the “knowledge-capital model of 
FDI” in order to explain the motives between horizontally and vertically integrated firms.  
In their model, the activity of multinational firms was tested as a function of various 
characteristics of the countries involved.  They estimated the real volume of production 
(sales) of foreign affiliates of American parent firms and sales of U.S. affiliates of foreign 
parent firms using the following predictor variables: 
- The sum of the parent and host/target country GDP, 
- Squared difference of the host and parent counties’ GDP, 
- Labor skill differences between the two countries, 
- An index (from zero to 100) representing the investment cost of the host country, 
- An index (zero to 100) representing trade costs with the host country, and 
- Distance (in miles) between the national capital of the parent and host countries. 
This model liberated researchers from trying to make the distinction between horizontally 
and vertically integrated firms, because both show economies of size, skill differences, 
and trade and investment costs as significant predictors of FDI (Carr, Markusen, & 
Maskus, 2001). 
Internalization 
The internalization model addressed firms’ incentives to take ownership in their 
subsidiaries rather than maintain arms-length partnerships with foreign entities.  Buckley 
and Casson (1985) explained their “internalization theory” as an attempt to integrate 
various theories into FDI models.  They described five primary advantages of 
internalization as follows: 
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1. The increased ability to control and plan production and in particular to co-
ordinate flows of crucial inputs 
2. Exploitation of market power by price discrimination prior to full cycle price 
competition? 
3. Avoidance of bilateral market power 
4. Avoidance of uncertainties associated with the transfer of knowledge between 
parties  
5. Avoidance of possible government intervention by devices such as transfer 
prices. 
 
Empirical Studies on FDI 
Empirical work on FDI is expansive:  two major bodies of empirical literature 
exist with regards to multinational firms and FDI.  The first, firm-level analysis has been 
conducted and focused on the intangible assets2, which give MNE’s incentive to expand.  
These assets, including those resulting from managerial prowess, corporate research and 
development, innovation act as shared technology goods readily transferred within 
company operating units, easily transferred to new plants and production facilities.  
Therefore, companies with such assets are more likely to have multiple plants than those 
without such qualities. 
The second group has organized empirical scholarship studies of exogenous 
factors associated with FDI.  These studies deal with the macroeconomic variables 
thought to determine FDI in a particular country and attempt to explain – though often 
only implicitly – Hymer’s (1960) observation that FDI is concentrated in some countries, 
while only sparse in others.  Ultimately, this latter field of empirical research attempts to 
                                                             
2
 In this context, intangible assets refer to assets that have no physical embodiment, including patents, 
trademarks, copyrights, business methodologies, and other non-physical sources of future benefit. (Lev, 
2005) 
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identify the variables which contribute to this phenomenon. The following review of 
empirical work on FDI covers only research on the macroeconomic determinants of FDI 
since the empirical work of this paper is directed to that field. The interested reader 
should refer to Blonigen (2005) or Caves (1996) for a more expansive overview of the 
empirical literature related to FDI and the multinational enterprise. 
External factors affecting FDI decisions can be categorized into two overarching 
areas:  economic, political, and social determinants.  Some of the empirical work in this 
area has tested the correlation between one of these categories and FDI, while others have 
attempted to build a comprehensive model which includes some or all of these 
characteristics.  The literature has focused most particularly on economic determinants; 
however, recent studies have placed more emphasis on the political and social 
determinants.  Up until the turn of the 21st century, availability of aggregate country-by-
country data was a major struggle for FDI empiricists.  Because the United States data 
was one of the only comprehensive and reliable records of FDI around the world, studies 
dating back more than twenty years generally dealt with FDI inflows or outflows from 
the United States.  More recently, multi-country data has become far more widely 
available, resulting in a new surge of panel studies that cover FDI throughout the world. 
Economic Determinants 
Initially, the relationship between exchange rates and FDI was of primary concern 
in the literature.  Early work of Hymer (1960), Kindleberger (1969), and Vernon (1966) 
shared a common belief that variations in exchange rates would not affect firms’ 
decisions to invest abroad.  Results from the work of Froot and Stein (1991) and Klein 
and Rosengren (1994) suggested flaws in that theory.  Both of their models showed an 
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inverse relationship between exchange rates and FDI inflows.  This led to the conclusion 
that depreciation of a country’s currency led to increases in foreign purchases of the 
developing country’s domestic assets.  Froot and Stein’s (1991) study was somewhat 
weak due to its small sample size and focus only on US observations, but Klein and 
Rosengren (1994) provided reinforcements to the claim, which included a large and 
diverse sample FDI in the US by seven source countries from 1979-1988.  Although a 
few papers’—including Herger, Kotsogiannis, and McCorriston (2008)—results were 
inconsistent with the claims made by Froot and Stein (1991) and Klein and Rosengren 
(1994), Blonigen (2005) found a majority agreed with these initial studies. 
Another area of interest with regards to economic determinants of FDI is 
corporate taxes.  Generally, the literature agrees host-country company taxes had a 
significant negative impact on FDI.  The studies of tax rates on FDI generally attempt to 
calculate the tax rate elasticity of foreign investment.  These elasticities indicate the size 
of the reaction by multinational firms to fluctuations in host country tax rates.  The 
majority found negative tax elasticity, meaning a one percent increase in taxes resulted in 
a less-than-one-percent decrease in foreign investment.  De Mooij and Ederveen (2003) 
disagreed; their meta-analysis compared the outcomes of 25 studies, and the tax rate 
elasticity of FDI found a median tax rate elasticity of FDI of -3.3.  This means a one 
percent increase in business taxes in a host country would result in a 3.3 percent decrease 
in country FDI.  Nonetheless, this body of literature was primarily concerned with 
estimating the amplitude – rather than general relationship – of tax rates and FDI. 
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Political Determinants 
The quality of political regimes in a given country is widely accepted as 
contributing to the FDI inflows and outflows of that country.  However, as Blonigen 
(2005) discussed, quantitative observation in this area is difficult owing to data issues as 
institutional quality was difficult to measure.  Also, the logical argument behind this 
theory is largely uncontroversial. The basic theory is that a country with poor institutional 
qualities such as enforcement of contracts, protection of property rights, and shareholder 
protection will be associated with relatively low levels of FDI, while countries with high 
quality institutions will be associated with high levels of FDI.  For example, few firms 
will be willing to invest in a country that is going through a major war or that has poor 
legal protection of property rights.  Since institutional quality is difficult to quantify and 
yet such a subjective theoretical concept is easily accepted or received, research tends to 
focus on other – perhaps more quantifiable – areas.  However, there have been several 
attempts to identify the political determinants, but which are the most highly correlated 
with FDI?  From this literature, trade protectionism, institutional quality, regional 
economic blocs (also known as trade blocs) are most common. 
Montero (2008) analyzed the political determinants of FDI in Latin America.  
Using a pooled cross-section time-series data set of fifteen Latin countries from 1985 to 
2003, he constructed an econometric model to test the impact of political institutions and 
economic variables on FDI.  He selected variables to categorize into three broad areas:  
risk-mitigating factors, cost-mitigating factors, and macroeconomic factors. 
Risk mitigating factors are those that deal with the transparency and structure of 
the institutions, as well as the protection of property rights and the availability of legal 
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recourse.  Cost mitigating factors, on the other hand, were those that dealt with the costs 
of moving capital and of hiring and firing workers.  Additionally, marginal tax rates were 
considered in this section.  Finally, macroeconomic factors and the level of economic 
reform (movement towards a free market system) were considered.  Macroeconomic 
indicators assess market size, population, income, inflation, etc., while the level of 
economic reform is measured using indices of country relative economic freedom.  
Montero (2008) determined that only a country’s current account balance (exports less 
imports per unit time) was a consistent predictor of FDI, and that things such as degree of 
integration into global markets, level of development, and relative economic freedom 
were not consistent predictors. 
Busse and Hefeker (2007) analyzed political factors affecting FDI in the 
developing world using an econometric model to estimate FDI inflows for 83 developing 
countries with political and institutional factors.  Those factors included government 
stability, socio-economic conditions, investment profile, internal conflict, external 
conflict, corruption, military in politics, religious tension, law and order, ethnic tension, 
democratic accountability, and the quality of the bureaucracies.  The most robust results 
were government stability, internal and external conflict, corruption, ethnic tensions, law 
and order, democratic accountability of government, and quality of bureaucracy. 
Finally, there is an offshoot literature that analyzes the effect of regional trade 
blocs on FDI.  A trade bloc is a group of countries – usually relatively close in 
geographic proximity – that participate in open and free trade.  Theoretically, one would 
expect to see the level of FDI to be relatively higher in countries who participate in trade 
blocs since the investment would provide the auxiliary benefit of easier trade amongst 
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countries within the trade bloc.  Motta and Norman (1996) and Donnenfeld (2003) 
explained the concept of “export platform” FDI.  This type of FDI was directly linked to 
countries with regional economic integration regimes – also known as trade blocs – like 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA, Canada, Mexico, and USA), the 
European Union (EU), the Association of Southeast Asian Countries (ASEAN), etc. 
Broadly, the theory states that when faced with many options of countries to 
invest in, multinational firms are more likely to invest in those which are involved in 
regional trade blocks because that investment provides them the ancillary benefit of 
market access to the countries that are associated with the trade bloc.  Motta and Norman 
(1996) developed a game theoretic model to explain this, and Donnenfeld (2003) 
provided a special equilibrium model to explain the effects of inter- and intra- bloc trade 
on FDI.  To date, no explicit empirical study focused on this area has been conducted. 
Social Determinants 
Social determinants of FDI are those determinants that are associated with human 
development factors of the labor force in a country.  Human development is a broad term 
that can be used to describe a multiplicity of human characteristics.  While there has not 
been much focus on the theoretical aspects of human development on FDI, there are 
some empirical studies that have examined these characteristics.  For example, Suliman 
and Mollick (2009) tested for correlation between literacy rates and war to FDI in Sub-
Saharan Africa and found that literacy rates and civil liberties have positive correlation 
with FDI inflows, while war events exert a strong negative force on FDI inflows. 
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Comprehensive Deterministic Models 
Recent studies have attempted to bring an array of determinants into a predictive 
model for FDI.  Bandelj (2002) analyzed the institutional, political, economic, and social 
connections between a host country and FDI.  She found variables within each category 
of politics, institutions, and culture had a strong correlation with FDI including bilateral 
investment treaties, being a member of the EU, the amount of foreign aid, and strong 
cultural ties between host and source country. 
Schneider and Frey (1985) created four econometric models to test various 
political and economic determinants of FDI in developing countries.  One model used 
only economic determinants, one used only political determinants, another used an 
amalgamated index of political and economic variables, and the final model used both 
political and economic variables.  Of these models, the simultaneous inclusion of 
economic and political indicators performed best.  Real GDP per capita and low balances 
of payments were the top economic determinants (and were both positively related to 
FDI), while the amount of bilateral aid coming from the western world and multilateral 
aid were the political variables with the most positive effect.  The authors also found that 
help from communist countries and political instability had the most negative effect on 
capital inflow. 
FDI and the Global Food Sector 
 
Though recently slowed with the global financial crisis of 2007-2011, FDI 
remains a substantial component in global economic expansion.  United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (UN, 2011) predicted global FDI 
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would return to pre-crisis levels in 2013.  The next growth wave is expected to be driven 
by FDI in the developing – rather than developed – world.  2010 was the first year 
developing economies absorbed almost half of the global FDI inflows, while 
simultaneously generating a record level of FDI outflows (UN, 2011).  In these countries, 
the food sector is relatively large in proportion to the economy as a whole.  Therefore, the 
increase in FDI in these countries could result in an increase in FDI in the food sector. 
Although recent literature covering FDI is extensive, only few studies have 
addressed FDI in the food sector directly.  First, Muehlfeld, Weitzel, and van 
Witteloostuijn (2011) studied factors affecting the completion or abandonment of 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in the food sector.  Second, McCorriston and Sheldon 
(1998) studied FDI in the United States by foreign firms.  Third, Nils, Kotsogiannis and 
McCoriston (2008) studied cross border acquisitions in the food industry using data that 
spans a panel of countries.  Finally, Makki, Somwaru, and Bolling (2004) compared food 
industry FDI between developed and developing countries. 
Muehlfeld, Weitzel, and van Witteloostuijn (2011) examined transaction-, firm- 
and institution-level factors that either facilitated completion or contribute to the 
abandonment of M&A in the global food sector.  Using announced and completed 
acquisition data from the Thomson Financial Securities Data’s “Worldwide Mergers and 
Acquisitions Database,” the authors estimated a logit regression model with M&A 
completion as the dependent variable.  Controlling for factors such as location, type of 
investor, and industry segment, a chi-square statistical test was used to test the 
significance of the various factors they predicted would contribute to the success of an 
acquisition. 
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One of the key findings of this study was that “difficult (strained) institutional 
environments” from developing and transition economies greatly reduced the probability 
of a successful M&A completion.  Surprisingly, they also found cross-border deals had a 
positive impact on the completion rate of an announced acquisition, implying cross-
border deals were less likely to be abandoned than their domestic counterparts.  Overall, 
the study concluded that a friendly transaction attitude, cash payment, and recent 
experience with M&A were the strongest contributors to the successful completion of an 
acquisition.  Conversely, bidding competition and simultaneous acquisition pursuits by 
the acquiring firm were among the factors that contributed most negatively to M&A 
completion rates. 
McCorriston and Sheldon (1998) discussed FDI of foreign firms purchasing U.S. 
food companies from the years 1985 to 1995.  In these years, almost all of the FDI was in 
the form of cross-border acquisition for the food sector, while total FDI (all industries) 
consisted of about 80% acquisition.  Their paper examined relative wealth effects on FDI 
in the manufacturing industry.  Variables used were relative stock price indices and real 
exchange rate.  FDI was divided into 5 sectors:  food, chemicals, fabricated materials, 
machinery, and other manufacturing.  Their model consisted of a range of binary 
variables; the study concluded that relative wealth effects have some power in explaining 
cross-border acquisitions in each industry except the food industry.  One of the primary 
weaknesses in this study was that it only looked at FDI in America by foreign firms.   
Nils, Kotsogiannis, and McCoriston (2008) used UNCTAD data to look at global 
acquisitions in the manufacturing sector from 1987-2000.  They analyzed cross border 
M&A; however, these transactions made up nearly 80% of all FDI, the results should be 
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consistent with results using the same model to predict FDI inflows. The food industry 
ranked among the leading sectors for acquisition in terms of overall M&A deal value.  
The USA is a major player in cross border acquisitions in the food industry as well as the 
UK, Netherlands, France, and Germany.  Also, it was often the case that food companies 
topped lists of biggest cross-border deal for any given year. 
The food sector is one of the leading sectors in terms of acquisitions in both the 
US and EU.  For the food sector, food processing accounts for 78% of M&A deals, while 
retailing accounts for 10% and wholesaling and agricultural production are minor 
activities.  Their paper provided a useful overview of a large set of data encompassing 
over 46 countries from 1997-2004 and food sector merger activities.  Because value data 
is difficult to acquire, this model uses count panel data, which tells us the number of 
acquisitions but not their corresponding value.  An econometric model is produced to 
predict the effect of economic variables on the number of acquisitions in a host country.  
The results mainly agreed with the existing literature; however, they found a relationship 
between exchange rates and investment, which is inconsistent with the general body of 
literature. 
Makki, Somwaru, and Bolling (2004) analyzed the differences between FDI in 
developed and developing countries.  Their study concluded that market size was the 
most important characteristic and was positively correlated to FDI.  Because the demand 
for processed food increases as incomes increase, the study found that FDI is positively 
correlated with per capita income in developing countries yet negatively correlated in 
developed countries.  The latter conclusion can be explained because developed countries 
already consume large quantities of processed foods.  As income in these countries rose, 
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the demand for special diets consisting of more fresh and less-processed foods increases, 
thus decreasing demand for more-processed foods.  The study also concluded that 
openness to trade was a significant factor for FDI in developed countries, but not critical 
in developing countries.  A negative correlation between FDI and exchange rate was 
found, which is consistent with their hypothesis; however, statistically significant rates 
only appeared in developed countries FDI.  Also, relative wages did not appear to be a 
critical factor for developed or developing countries and neither did the U.S. interest rate. 
Summary of the Literature Review 
Despite its relatively short existence, the literature on FDI is rich with both 
theoretical and empirical research.  Once Hymer (1960) presented the industrial 
organization approach – an alternative to the traditional perfect markets approach – to 
analyzing FDI flows, a vast body of literature studying the market imperfections which 
impact FDI ensued.  This literature has identified an assortment of variables which 
impact FDI including those that are economic, political, and socio-economic in nature.  
This thesis will add to this body of literature in two ways.  First, the study provides a 
comparison between the determinants of food sector and total FDI.  Second, the paper 
will provide an extensive analysis on the effects of regional trade blocs and regulatory 
factors on FDI in total and in the food sector specifically.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
The Logic of the Model 
The underlying model for this paper is that FDI is a function of economic and 
political conditions in the host country.  Therefore, the primary concern of this study is 
the linkages between economic and political variables and FDI.  The models build on the 
model by Herger, Kotsogiannis, and McCoriston (2008), with the ultimate aim of 
assessing the effects of country language, regulatory conditions, and affiliation in 
regional trade blocs on FDI.  These independent factors will be used to predict two 
dependent variables:  U.S. FDI in the food sector and total U.S. FDI. 
Procedures for Data Collection 
This analysis is comprised of data from 35 countries from the years 2001-2008.  
The countries were selected based on the availability of the data for the dependent and 
independent variables from models specified previously as Equations 1, 2, and 3 (see 
Table 1). 
Data Collection Problems 
The goal of this study was to examine FDI by American firms in as many host 
countries as available.  The two dependent variables, Total FDI and Food Sector FDI, 
from the United States Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Statistics (BES) 
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provided a historical account of US FDI outflows to 35 host or receiving countries.3  
After observations for all the independent variables were collected, the time span had 
become limited to the years 2001-2008, resulting in a pooled sample size of 282. 
Proxies 
There were two occasions where proxies were required to fill holes in the data.  
First, both FDItot and FDIfood had some country-years that were undisclosed only for one 
or two of the years in the time span.  For these observations, a simple median was 
calculated between the year prior and the year after.  There were few occasions where 
more than one year was missing in a row, in which case an arithmetic mean of the total 
observable periods for that country during the 2001-2008 time span was used.  Second, 
relative wage rates were not observable for all the countries and years.  The UBS Prices 
and Earnings Report is updated once every three years and has a more expansive dataset 
for each new release.  Therefore, almost every country chosen for this study is 
represented in the newest edition of the UBS Prices and Earnings Report (2009), while 
several countries were not included in the prior editions.  For these countries, gross 
domestic product per capita (GDPPC) provides wage proxies for major cities in each 
country relative to New York City wages as a base 100.0.  For the wage proxies, the 
GDPPC was compared to the GDPPC in the United States and “scaled down” to reflect 
relative GDPPC with the United States’ observation as base or 100.0. 
  
                                                             
3 The BES database provides FDI information for over 70 countries; however, more than half of the 
observations were not disclosed in order to protect investments made by individual firms. 
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Procedures for Data Analysis 
The determinants of firms’ FDI will be categorized into two broad areas:  
economic and political factors.  To test these determinants, three models will be 
constructed to observe the linear relationships between each determinant and FDI.  These 
econometric results will be evaluated based on the t-value from the regression output at 
the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels.  Also, the performance of the model as a whole will be 
evaluated using the F-statistic at α= 0.10 level. 
The first model establishes a baseline which the second and third models will 
enhance.  The baseline model closely follows Herger, Kotsogiannis, and McCoriston 
(2008) with a few minor adjustments.  Thus it covers the factors of market size, trade 
cost, relative labor cost, financial factors, and language barriers.  Host country GDP was 
selected to represent market size, while trade costs are seen as a function of U.S. and host 
country distance.  Relative labor costs were represented by a labor index from the Fraser 
Institute’s Economic Freedom in the World Report (2010), in which each country is given 
a score that represents the cost of labor relative to the rest of the world.  A similar index 
was used for relative country tax rates to represent the financial factors.  Finally, host 
country official language dummy variables were included. 
The goal of the second model is to observe the impact of regional trade blocs on 
FDI. The model will build on model 1 by incorporating dummy variables for regional 
trading blocs North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the European Union (EU), 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Common Southern Market 
(MERCOSUR), the world’s major RTAs. 
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Finally, model 3 tests the impact of three political variables:  labor market 
regulation, credit market regulations, and transfers and subsidies, again nested within 
earlier models. 
Model 1:  Baseline Model 
Model 1 goals are twofold:  first, the results of this model should be contrasted to 
a known result comparison for both food sector and total FDI and secondly creating this 
model is to provide a base model to which the variables in models two and three can be 
added. 
The model examines the effects of market size (GDP), relative wages (Wage), 
physical distance (Distance), corporate tax rate (Tax), Exports (Exports), and language 
differences (Spanish, French, Other Languages) for time (t=2001, 2008) and country 
(i=1, 35). 
 
Equation 1.  US Firms’ FDI Baseline Model. 
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Model 2. Baseline Plus Regional Trade Blocs  
The objective of the second model is to study the impact of countries’ 
involvement in regional trade agreements on FDI.  For this model, the four most 
predominant RTA’s were selected and include:  NAFTA, EU, ASEAN, and 
MERCOSUR for time (t=2001, 2008) and country (i=1, 35).  For each RTA, a dummy 
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variable is used to indicate the countries’ involvement.  The four RTA’s are expected to 
produce significant positive relationships with FDI. 
 
Equation 2.  Baseline Model with Regional Trade Bloc Addition. 
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Model 3.Baseline Plus Regional Trade Blocs and Regulatory Variables 
The third model will observe the impact of regulation on FDI.  Adding to model 
1, this model will include variables from the Frazer Institute’s Economic Freedom in the 
World report.  The variables are Labor Regulations (LaborReg), Credit Market 
Regulation (CreditReg), and Transfers and Subsidies (Transfers) for time (t=2001, 2008) 
and country (i=1, 35).  Of these variables, labor regulations and credit market regulation 
are index values, while transfers and subsidies are in constant U.S. dollars.  The 
regulatory indices, including labor regulations, credit regulations, and transfers and 
subsidies are expected to have a negative impact on FDI, while trade openness is 
expected to have a positive influence on FDI. 
Equation 3. Regulatory Determinants Model 
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Comparison of the Models 
Equation 4.  Chow F-Statistic for Variable Inclusion 
 
 
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Where:  SSR0 = sum of the squared residuals for the base or original model, 
     SSR1 = sum of the squared residuals for the expanded model, 
     Df0 = Degrees of freedom for the base model, and 
     Df1 =Degrees of freedom for the expanded model. 
 
After, models 2 and 3 are subject to a Chow F test for variable inclusion. 
In addition to the comparison between the three models, an ancillary aim of this 
study is to determine the model with the greatest predictive capacity.  Since model one’s 
arguments are retained or nested in model two and model two is nested in model three, 
Chow-F tests were used to the contributions of the added variables.  The Chow F test 
calculates the reduction of unexplained sums-of-squares residuals per additional degree 
of freedom used compared to a first model (model 1) and it follows an F distribution.  
The calculation for the Chow F value is shown in Equation 4.
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Table 1. List of Variables for the Three US FDI Models, 2000-2008. 
Indicator   Units   Description   Source 
Dependent Variable 
Food Sector 
FDI  
U.S. 
Dollars  
New investment dollars by U.S. 
firms in the global food sector.  BEA 
       
Total FDI  U.S. Dollars  
New investment dollars by U.S. 
firms in foreign countries  BAE 
       
Independent Variables 
Model 1  Baseline – Traditional FDI factors.   
       
Market Size  GDP US $   
Market value of all final goods 
produced in the host country i in 
year t . 
 IMF 
       
Distance  Miles  Physical distance between capital 
cities of the host country i and US   
Google Maps 
 
       
Exports  U.S. Dollars  
Annual sum of all goods and 
services produced in host country, 
but exported. 
 IMF 
       
Wage  Index  Difference in mean wages in host 
countries and the US.   
UBS Prices and 
Earnings 
       
Taxes  Percent  Difference between host & US total tax rate.  
World Bank 
Doing Business 
Survey 
       
Spanish  Dummy  1 if Spanish official language, 0 
else  
CIA World Fact 
Book(WFB) 
       
French  Dummy  1 if French official language, 0 
else  CIA WFB  
       
Other 
Languages  Dummy  
1 if official language other than 
English, Spanish, or French  CIA WFB 
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Model 2 Regional Trade Bloc Influences 
       
NAFTA   Dummy  1 a member of NAFTA, 0 else.  
WTO Regional 
Trade Agreements 
Database(RTAD) 
       
EU   Dummy  1 if a member of the EU, 0 else.  WTO RTAD 
 
       
ASEAN  Dummy  1 if a member ASEAN, 0 else.  WTO RTAD 
 
       
MERCOSUR   Dummy  1 if a member of MERCOSUR, 0 
else.  WTO RTAD  
       
Model 3 Political Impact Additional Regulatory Variables 
       
Labor Laws  Index  
Host government regulates hiring, 
firing, minimum wage setting, and 
work hours. 
 
Economic Freedom 
in the World Report 
(EFWR) 
      
 
Credit Laws  Index  
Regulated bank ownership, 
competition with foreign banks, 
and interest rates. 
 
EFWR  
      
 
Subsidies and 
Transfers  Percent  
Total value of transfers and 
subsidies as% of GDP.  EFWR  
       
 
Assumptions 
Randomness of Sample 
The number of countries used in the sample as well as the time span was based on 
data availability.  The observations are assumed to be random; however, some biases may 
exist for countries where data is available versus countries with no data availability. 
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Statistical Considerations 
This study assumes the four principle justifications for regression analysis – 
linearity, independence, homoscedasticity, and normality – meet the requirements for 
statistical inference.  To ensure the assumption of linearity holds true, real versus 
predicted values were plotted and observed.  Since this is a time series experiment, an 
autocorrelation plot was created to observe independence between variables.  Finally, 
normality is assumed and was examined using a basic normality test. 
Investment Success or Failure 
Since the value of all investments was used as the independent variable, no 
consideration was given to the quality of each investment.  Since this study is an attempt 
to evaluate the relative attractiveness of investment, this should have no impact on the 
value of the results. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE STUDY 
Serial Correlation Issues 
Serial correlation was identified in baseline model (Model 1) using the Durbin-
Watson test for serial correlation.  In this test, the time-series component of the data is 
analyzed to determine if successive residual errors (et ~ et-1) correlation exists, a violation 
of ordinary least squares assumptions.  After applying the test to the data used in this 
study, such serial correlation was identified.  For model one, the Durban-Watson Statistic 
was 0.42, which suggests the error terms had high 1st order positive autocorrelation. 
 
Figure 1. Durbin-Watson Statistic for US FDI Model 1.1. 
Positive 
Autocorrelation 
Inconclusive No 
Autocorrelation 
Inconclusive Negative 
Autocorrelation 
 
 
 
The remedy for serial correlation used was an application of the Johnson, 
Johnson, and Buse (1987) transformation of the data for serial correlation correction by 
adjusting the error terms using a three step process: 
1. Calculate  9                      9  1 6  527 
Where d = the Durbin-Watson d-statistic. 
0 1.73 1.91 2.09 2.37 4 
0.42 
Durbin-Watson for 
Model 1.1 
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2. Transform the data using the following equations to obtain Y* and X* 
;<  ; 6 ;= 
><  > 6 >= 
3. Then, execute the regression analysis using the transformed data. 
 
Applying these steps to each data observation brought the Durbin-Watson result 
to an acceptable range, meaning the autocorrelation was adjusted out of the data.  
Appendix 3 shows the results for original (non-adjusted) data with Durbin Watson 
statistics. 
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Table 2.  Results for US FDItot and FDIfood Models for 35 Countries from 2001 through 2008. 
 
Notes:  Coefficients significant at the 10% level are labeled with *, at the 5% level with **, and at the 1% level with ***.  The number in parentheses is the t-value 
for each coefficient.  All regressions are GLS models after correcting for first order serial correlation.
Dependent Variable
Constant 45868 *** (6.79) 590.2 *** (2.87) 37460 *** (4.85) 316.3 (1.25) 23878 ** (2.36) 515.1 (1.54)
GDP 50.68 *** (4.63) 1.6485 *** (4.95) 63.71 *** (5.66) 1.801 *** (4.92) 65.05 *** (5.76) 1.7883 *** (4.84)
Wage 298.7 * (1.62) -5.972 (-1.06) 373.8 ** (2.10) -4.921 (-0.85) 380.6 ** (2.09) -4.913 (-0.82)
Distance
-17769 *** (-5.51) -314.62 *** (-3.24) -17326 *** (-4.12) -220.6 * (-1.60) -17504 *** (-4.18) -221.2 (-1.59)
Exports
-26.98 (-1.31) -0.3613 (-0.56) -132.88 *** (-4.91) -2.5169 *** (-2.71) -130.72 *** (-4.83) -2.5593 *** (-2.73)
Tax
-1332 (-0.72) 85.97 (1.51) -102 (-0.06) 115.64 ** (2.03) -399 (-0.23) 120.6 ** (2.11)
Spanish
-34029 *** (-6.13) -495.2 *** (-2.94) -35409 *** (-6.51) -496.3 *** (-2.82) -33219 *** (-6.04) -533.8 *** (-2.96)
French
-9518 ** (-2.09) -60.3 (-0.44) -14423 *** (-3.27) -109.2 (-0.77) -13272 *** (-3.00) -125.3 (-0.87)
Other Languages
-19293 *** (-5.49) -305.8 *** (-2.89) -19034 *** (-5.69) -279.2 *** (-2.60) -16388 *** (-4.67) -319.2 *** (-2.81)
NAFTA 44836 *** (5.92) 928.6 *** (3.66) 43286 *** (5.65) 951.3 *** (3.69)
EU 8744 ** (2.43) 224.6 ** (1.90) 10310 *** (2.74) 203.3 * (1.63)
ASEAN 13734 *** (2.97) 106.3 (0.72) 12885 *** (2.79) 114.7 (0.77)
MERCOSUR
-2232 (-0.53) 15.6 (0.11) 362 (0.08) -24.5 (-0.17)
Labor 5106 ** (2.07) -80.25 (-1.00)
Credit 289 (0.13) -5.01 (-0.07)
Transfers 2812 (1.19) -33.08 (-0.43)
Summary Statistics
R-squared (%) 34.9 16.3 46 21.4 47.1 21.7
F-statistic 18.38 *** 6.56 *** 19.15 *** 6.00 *** 15.87 *** 4.85 ***
Durbin Watson 1.887 2.002 2.028 2.054 1.992 2.058
Degrees of Freedom 273 273 269 269 266 266
3.2                                       
Food Sector FDI
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
1.1                                    
Total FDI
1.2                                                   
Food Sector FDI
2.1                        
Total FDI
2.2                                     
Food Sector FDI
3.1                                  
Total FDI
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Analysis 
Table 2 presents the results relating to the determinants of FDItot and FDIfood by 
American companies abroad.  The first column for each model presents generalized least 
squares (GLS) coefficients after finding substantial first order serial correlation.  
GDP or market size had a positive significant relationship at the 0.01 level in all 
six models.  This result agrees with the conceptual argument that greater FDI receiving 
country GDP (or larger market size) the greater chance of attracting FDI. 
Wage levels were positive and significant in each of the FDItot models, but 
insignificant in each of the FDIfood models.  The positive sign for wage level suggests that 
FDI tends to occur in countries with a more highly paid, and a more highly skilled 
workforce is implicit.  This suggests that the effect of companies’ investing abroad in 
order to take advantage of low wages is outweighed by firms seeking a more 
sophisticated labor market or a higher income consumer market. 
Taxes are insignificant in all but two models.  The two models revealed 
significant results at α = 0.05 level were FDIfood two and three.  It is difficult to explain 
why the introduction of the regional trade blocs to the model would cause the tax rates to 
become significantly correlated in the food sector, as signs were positive, suggesting 
higher taxes increase investment.  One explanation would be that certain trade blocs, such 
as NAFTA and the EU, tend to have higher tax rates and, therefore, higher quality public 
goods such as roads in rural areas. 
Exports between the host country and the U.S. were insignificant in the base 
model for both total and food sector FDI; however, the second and third models exports 
were significant and negative.  In these models, the exports variables act as a proxy for 
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openness to trade, which obviates interest in FDI.  More export activity between 
countries suggests fewer tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade.  A negative correlation 
may suggest companies use FDI as a strategy for avoiding barriers-to-trade. 
All three models included a language component.  Dummy variables were set up 
to identify official country language per the CIA World Factbook (2011).  Spanish or 
Other Languages showed significant negative correlation, an American language barrier.  
French speaking countries had negative correlation with FDItot, but no correlation with 
FDIfood.  This implies language barriers may have been greater deterrents to FDI in other 
industries than in the food sector. 
Of the four RTAs used in model 2 (NAFTA, EU, ASEAN, MERCOSUR), 
NAFTA displayed the most positive and significant results.  This is an expected outcome, 
since the United States is a member of NAFTA and two other members are both proximal 
countries.  Additionally, the EU showed consistently significant influence on FDI both in 
food sector and all industries, but at roughly one-quarter the level of NAFTA.  ASEAN 
showed positive results in the aggregate FDI models, while not significant for food sector 
investment, it was a significant positive relationship FDItot.  The food sector represents a 
lower regional interest by food firms as compared to other countries or regions. 
The models which included labor market, credit market, and transfers and 
subsidies indicators provided only one significant observation.  The labor market 
regulation index showed a positive relationship to FDItot at the five percent level.  This is 
most likely because the FDI tends to flow first towards more developed countries, despite 
those countries tending to have higher levels of labor market regulation. 
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Differences Between Food Sector and Aggregate FDI 
Several differences occur between FDItot and FDIfood.  These differences imply 
that management decisions differ for food processor or agribusiness MNEs than for 
MNEs throughout the rest of industry.  The results of this study show differences in five 
areas:  wages, language, distance, association with the ASEAN trade bloc, and labor 
market regulations (see Table 2). 
In the first model, the distance from the host country to the US was significant 
and negative, which is consistent with the hypothesis that longer distance represents 
higher transfer costs, which shares a negative relationship with FDI.  In models two and 
three, however, distance did not share any relationship with FDI but still showed a 
significant and negative relationship with total FDI.  This implies that the inclusion of 
regional trade blocs, which were added to model two, have an influence on distance for 
food sector FDI while having no effect on total FDI. 
From the results, we can see that U.S. FDI is more probable in ASEAN member-
countries in general; however, food and agribusiness companies are not significantly 
more inclined to invest in ASEAN member-countries.  One explanation for this is that 
ASEAN member countries have large manufacturing industries that American firms are 
interested in acquiring, whereas the agribusiness sector in these countries is relatively 
small and unattractive to investment. 
French-speaking countries produced a negative and significant output for 
aggregate FDI but no significant results were captured for food sector FDI.  This implies 
that firms generally are less inclined to invest in French-speaking countries, but 
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agribusiness firms’ decision to invest in a country is not contingent on whether the host 
country is English or French speaking. 
Model Predictive Performance 
Table 3 shows the results of the Chow-F test for all six models.  Models 
numbered 1.1, 2.1, and 3.1 are the three FDItot models, and models 1.2, 2.2, and 3.2 are 
the FDIfood models.  Each row in the table represents the comparison of two models, and 
columns 3 through 6 provide the values necessary to execute the Chow-F test. 
 
Table 3. Chow F Test Results for FDIfood and FDItot Models 
Reduced 
Model 
Expanded 
Model 
SSR 
(reduced) 
SSR 
(expanded) 
Df 
(reduced) 
Df 
(expanded) 
Chow 
F-value 
1.1 2.1 1.05653E+11 87715167422 274 270 13.804 * 
2.1 3.1 87715167422 85837050141 270 267 1.947 * 
1.1 3.1 1.05653E+11 85837050141 274 267 8.805 * 
1.2 2.2 94714444 89019015 269 265 4.239 * 
2.2 3.2 89019015 88602644 265 262   0.410  
1.2 3.2 94714444 88602644 269 262 2.582 * 
 
As Table 3 shows, model 3.1 is the best model for determining FDItot, whereas 
model 2.2 is best model for predicting FDIfood.  This implies the Freedom in the World 
indicators for transfers, subsidies, and credit and labor market regulations have a greater 
influence on aggregate FDI than FDI in the food sector specifically.  However, when 
looking specifically at the food sector, these variables do not add predictive value to the 
model and, therefore, do not significantly affect FDI in the global food sector. 
The performance of the model varies when the predicted FDI values are plotted 
against observed FDI.  The predicted values closely resemble the observed FDI values in 
 many instances.  Overall, as F
observed FDI across all countries at any given point in time is relatively accurate.
 
Figure 2.  Predicted Versus Observed FDI for 
Also, as Figures 3 and 4 show, the model performs well for single countries over 
the time span of 2001-2008 in many cases, especially for developed countries where the 
data does not change drastically from year to year.
Most cases of poor model performance showed highly negative FDI predictions.  
As Figure 5 shows, one of the variables in the model has a
the model outcome when it interacts with the rest of the model.  This tended to happen 
with Spanish speaking countries more than others, but there are cases where Spanish 
speaking countries performed well (
speaking countries yielding the same outcome (
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igure 2 below shows, the general level of predicted versus
All Countries (2008). 
 
 tendency to severely impact 
Figure 3), and there are examples of non
Figure 6).  Also, there seems to be no 
 
 
 
 
-Spanish 
 regional pattern for this so it doesn’t seem to be traceable back to any one dummy 
variable. See appendix two for prediction versus actual grap
years. 
 
Figure 3. Predicted Versus Observed FDI in Spain (2001
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hs for all countries over all 
-2008). 
 
 
 Figure 4. Predicted Versus Observed FDI in Korea (2001
Figure 5. Predicted Versus Observed FDI in Ecuador (2001
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-2008). 
 
 
 
 Figure 6. Predicted Versus Observed FDI in Taiwan (2001
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-2008). 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
This paper has presented a simple model for FDI that examines language, regional 
trade association, and regulatory barriers as determinants.  The determinants were 
analyzed for FDI across all sectors as well as FDI in the food sector alone.  Therefore the 
aim of this paper was twofold:  1) to analyze the observations of FDI determinants, and 
2) to compare the results for the aggregate FDI model with the results from the food 
sector FDI model.  Three models were used to estimate the effects of market size, taxes, 
distance, wages, exports, language barriers, association with RTAs, and regulations on 
FDI. 
The results in this study agree largely with the theoretical hypotheses from which 
it was conducted.  Market size and association with regional trading blocs generally have 
a positive impact on FDI, while distance and language differences generally have a 
negative impact on FDI.  The results for countries that are members of the MERCOSUR 
trade bloc didn’t show any correlation with FDI, which suggests that countries’ 
involvement in MERCOSUR is neither an incentive or deterrent in the FDI decision 
making process for American firms.  Finally, with only one exception, the variables in 
model three – Labor and Credit Market Regulations, and Transfers and Subsidies – were 
not correlated with FDI in the food sector or in total. 
In each model, wages were positively correlated in FDItot, but showed no 
correlation with FDIfood.  The positive correlation with aggregate FDI suggests that 
American firms are more likely to invest in higher income countries where the population 
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has higher disposable income to spend on the good or service they provide.  Agribusiness 
firms, on the other hand, show no correlation with wage levels in the countries in which 
they choose to invest.  This can be explained using the principle that low-income earners 
spend a proportionally larger amount on food than those with higher incomes.  Therefore, 
investment in the food sector is more likely to be profitable in low-income countries 
where people have less disposable income than other sectors of the economy. 
Recommendations and Suggestions for Further Research 
Data Availability Improvement 
Data availability and variable identification are the primary weaknesses of this 
study.  As data becomes more available, the analysis could be strengthened immensely.  
This study was only able to observe FDI determinants for developed countries, which 
excludes much of the world for analysis.  It would add strength to the model if more 
countries could be included.  Also, variable identification was difficult for analyzing 
regulatory determinants.  The three variables used come from an index that ranks 
countries based on various determinants of their own.  Each index is a proxy in itself and 
is simplified into a 1-10 scale.  This makes analysis difficult because there isn’t much 
variability between observations.  Finally, a longer time series would be beneficial for 
analysis in order to show countries before and after accession into regional trade blocs. 
Model Performance Improvement 
As discussed in the results section, certain models predicted highly negative FDI.  
This outcome could be caused by a number of issues including problems with the 
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coefficients from the indicator variables or the need for inclusion of one or more 
independent variables in the model.  A more thorough evaluation of the statistical 
elements of the model could yield more plausible results. 
Analysis of New RTAs 
With the newly formed Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and 
the promising development of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), new and interesting 
relationships are being formed in the global marketplace.  It would be interesting to see 
the results of this study against a new set of future data that reflects these new 
partnerships. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
 
Complete Data Set of US FDI for 35 Countries from 2001 through 2008. 
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    Dependent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Country Year Total FDI 
US Food 
Sector 
FDI 
GDP 
 
Wages 
 
Exports  Distance  Taxes 
E
n
g
l 
i
s
h 
S
p
a
n 
i 
s 
h 
F
r
e
n
c
h 
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t 
h 
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r  
 
N
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A 
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E
A
N 
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E
R
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S 
U
R 
Labor 
Market 
Regulation 
Credit 
Market 
Regulation 
Transfers 
and 
subsidies 
Australia 2001 255.98 215.67 30.07 19.058 -8.235 2.0781 0.63 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.66295 4.69742 8.24796 
Belgium 2001 8390.3 107.64 24.17 24.876 5.0409 0.8112 0.21 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 4.55028 4.65572 8.24796 
Brazil 2001 3020.6 -680.94 17.27 -3.015 6.4412 0.8862 1.155 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 4.97173 4.69245 8.24796 
Canada 2001 47948 710.51 71.22 5.6726 204.84 0.0958 2.63 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 4.88840 4.71315 8.36240 
China 2001 3280.4 103.06 197.92 8.4106 -68.57 1.4542 1.26 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5.00016 4.52977 8.20163 
Colombia 2001 204.53 22.1 9.60 -0.135 -75.09 0.4991 1.155 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 4.97986 7.42084 8.29428 
Costa Rica 2001 479.36 26.01 1.94 2.2632 -1.625 0.4300 1.47 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.97986 7.43356 8.29428 
Dominican Republic 2001 213.03 39.72 3.01 1.6819 1.9033 0.3097 1.89 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.89902 7.43356 8.29428 
Ecuador 2001 -78.28 13.04 4.54 1.693 -1.295 0.5678 1.68 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 4.81620 7.18356 8.29428 
France 2001 6448.9 179.64 145.57 18.106 29.711 0.8043 0.21 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 3.70288 6.50700 8.70921 
Germany 2001 19545 139.06 194.50 22.947 35.054 0.8757 1.63 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 5.26617 6.28810 8.70921 
Honduras 2001 -88.21 7.14 1.02 0.717 -43.54 0.3826 1.89 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.46061 7.12200 8.70921 
Hong Kong SAR 2001 10811 4.84 16.43 0.4504 7.1762 1.7110 2.1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.43524 6.64348 8.70921 
India 2001 616.59 -5.19 56.78 2.7927 2.1169 1.5721 1.68 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5.36504 9.00000 7.59673 
Indonesia 2001 3476.8 7.73 14.74 4.4416 2.411 2.1342 1.26 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 5.36504 8.58221 7.45906 
Ireland 2001 11178 -125.76 14.84 29.163 10.518 0.7103 0.55 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 5.48128 8.76321 7.09597 
Israel 2001 2739.4 13.2 12.09 4.1131 -2.655 1.2382 0.525 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5.47779 8.72747 7.52987 
Italy 2001 4330.6 144.66 126.26 15.877 14.342 0.9416 0.63 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 5.98794 7.67474 8.59401 
Japan 2001 10549 -12.12 170.00 -5.616 107.68 1.4226 1.05 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 6.10849 6.67536 8.38965 
Korea 2001 2892.3 89.92 40.07 1.6734 -64.73 1.4568 1.55 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5.69636 6.61644 8.38965 
Malaysia 2001 1240.1 8.32 9.34 4.5723 -5.453 2.0011 1.68 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 6.11303 6.60141 8.80654 
Mexico 2001 21456 122.67 92.43 2.5046 113.69 0.3955 2.05 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 5.87380 6.48237 8.61316 
Netherlands 2001 56498 -1334.4 49.29 26.165 -94.24 0.8077 0.025 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 5.94148 7.62154 8.63760 
Norway 2001 986.59 5.62 19.27 51.807 -2.314 0.8132 0.735 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5.94148 7.67288 9.34605 
Philippines 2001 2562 33.7 5.87 1.4084 7.2153 1.7978 1.47 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 6.50177 8.06755 9.34332 
Poland 2001 1504.6 138.45 28.91 6.6756 -7.995 0.9364 0.735 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 6.35906 7.87310 9.34605 
Russia 2001 -23.13 70.87 53.90 8.9264 5.5118 1.0200 2.155 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5.92127 7.95446 9.49377 
Singapore 2001 21699 3.1 6.23 5.7808 10.051 2.0284 1.89 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 6.15721 7.47849 9.49377 
South Africa 2001 256.02 -9.17 5.91 0.3166 -7.418 1.7025 0.84 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.54031 7.48121 9.51226 
Spain 2001 11398 191.75 76.90 13.823 1.6956 0.7939 1.84 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 6.12364 7.48992 9.57221 
Switzerland 2001 20020 36.74 29.26 35.111 5.5637 0.8610 1.68 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 5.97208 6.57342 8.11444 
Taiwan 2001 3110.6 53.66 16.11 5.7304 25.735 1.6504 1.47 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 6.47285 7.35277 8.00272 
Thailand 2001 1575 13.19 8.90 -0.211 -11.64 1.8448 1.47 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 6.47285 7.30066 8.25341 
United Kingdom 2001 45928 1550.18 151.21 26.912 29.734 0.7697 0.05 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 6.39305 7.44612 8.41125 
Venezuela 2001 1749.5 106.88 15.62 -0.728 -17.43 0.4323 1.68 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 6.31597 7.44612 8.41125 
Australia 2002 17129 -153.56 67.74 12.446 -5.569 2.0781 0.63 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.57005 4.45025 9.85831 
Belgium 2002 7881.7 30.72 37.16 17.021 4.6884 0.8112 0.21 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 3.66945 4.85025 9.85831 
Brazil 2002 2296.7 114.71 31.47 2.3306 8.0332 0.8862 1.155 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 3.76667 6.65025 9.85831 
Canada 2002 45918 1450.41 89.23 12.731 196.62 0.0958 1.05 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3.90556 6.85025 9.85831 
China 2002 1026 165.09 217.17 3.1736 -39.99 1.4542 1.26 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3.76590 6.85025 9.85831 
Colombia 2002 155.62 -36.52 10.57 2.0579 -93.3 0.4991 1.155 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 3.92900 7.95019 9.59128 
Costa Rica 2002 353.35 25.9 2.05 2.2053 -1.286 0.4300 0.47 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.92900 7.95019 9.59128 
Dominican Republic 2002 101.36 -1.35 2.87 1.4671 1.6867 0.3097 0.89 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.68345 7.95019 9.59128 
Ecuador 2002 351.59 39.72 4.25 1.4914 -1.15 0.5678 1.68 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 3.73673 7.95019 9.59128 
Egypt 2002 661.97 -12.22 6.09 0.3583 -0.337 1.2200 1.47 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4.01252 7.01056 9.21526 
France 2002 11649 585.2 212.76 13.24 27.169 0.8043 0.71 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 4.01252 6.41056 9.10082 
Germany 2002 10990 -576.22 279.60 16.599 40.196 0.8757 0.84 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 4.91667 5.33345 9.70845 
Honduras 2002 1.67 2.14 0.95 0.6075 -46.12 0.3826 1.89 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.36111 5.40608 9.68392 
Hong Kong SAR 2002 14659 6.68 16.73 7.7107 6.7517 1.7110 2.1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.17320 5.49904 9.55586 
India 2002 2260.2 2.03 66.05 3.2107 4.4492 1.5721 0.68 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4.97846 6.26326 9.43869 
Ireland 2002 20361 32.66 21.76 15.744 14.819 0.7103 0.945 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4.85917 6.26620 6.92371 
Israel 2002 1230.9 -10.32 7.96 8.1322 -5.31 1.2382 1.025 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4.96225 6.32700 6.92371 
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Italy 2002 5693.4 273.14 181.10 11.033 14.412 0.9416 1.13 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 4.98487 8.41694 3.40256 
Japan 2002 22504 56.28 351.17 16.934 102.29 1.4226 1.05 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5.03532 8.41198 3.40256 
Korea 2002 3974.2 175.28 95.06 7.5868 -60.36 1.4568 1.655 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5.38890 8.24046 3.40256 
Malaysia 2002 1184.7 -12.58 14.67 3.595 -4.093 2.0011 1.68 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 5.27779 8.14202 3.03542 
Mexico 2002 14793 1171.5 75.48 2.281 115.65 0.3955 2.26 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 5.46332 8.21133 3.28065 
Netherlands 2002 41742 68.91 65.43 16.041 -96.5 0.8077 0.42 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 5.51494 9.13222 3.32970 
Norway 2002 2532.7 5.83 30.44 23.529 -1.938 0.8132 0.735 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5.51494 9.21572 3.34332 
Philippines 2002 1669.6 90.28 11.21 1.3388 6.3642 1.7978 1.47 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 5.43385 9.21531 3.19074 
Poland 2002 618.33 20.9 25.23 3.2231 -7.566 0.9364 0.735 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5.61549 9.21531 3.41962 
Russia 2002 437.43 27.86 55.08 2.7521 5.9945 1.0200 2.365 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2.85448 8.15396 2.28716 
Singapore 2002 18751 1.31 11.26 6.6446 9.3749 2.0284 2.89 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2.80692 8.00005 2.28716 
South Africa 2002 908.7 -68.52 9.01 4.7355 -7.66 1.7025 1.34 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.34499 8.11250 2.28716 
Spain 2002 15744 -46.93 110.87 9.0868 2.5462 0.7939 1.05 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 3.53943 8.09419 2.00817 
Switzerland 2002 23852 -194.1 41.13 23.69 4.853 0.8610 1.68 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3.68972 8.10083 2.34060 
Taiwan 2002 2796.2 21.9 36.36 8.0083 24.736 1.6504 1.47 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3.93736 7.98957 2.29428 
Thailand 2002 2895 5.24 18.99 1.7107 -10.6 1.8448 0.47 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 3.93736 8.11651 2.55586 
United Kingdom 2002 67650 -978.24 241.20 16.264 29.059 0.7697 1.84 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3.89171 8.21595 2.89918 
Venezuela 2002 716.49 214.86 -3.19 2.281 -17.09 0.4323 0.68 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 3.93644 8.21595 2.94550 
Australia 2003 17579 377.45 107.92 12.446 -5.51 2.0781 0.63 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.72123 7.01010 9.04632 
Belgium 2003 7090.7 92.53 58.17 17.021 5.074 0.8112 0.21 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 5.15321 7.59469 9.04632 
Brazil 2003 7750.6 211.09 82.24 2.3306 9.8991 0.8862 1.155 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 5.02885 8.23866 9.04632 
Canada 2003 56439 683.13 147.99 12.731 207.45 0.0958 1.05 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 5.27885 7.97646 9.04632 
China 2003 2910.7 192.25 253.40 3.1736 -22.62 1.4542 1.26 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5.01719 8.22587 9.98365 
Colombia 2003 701.62 -27.48 8.51 2.0579 -114 0.4991 1.155 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 5.41891 8.92036 10.00000 
Costa Rica 2003 -584.4 20.37 2.12 2.1708 -1.68 0.4300 2.26 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.41891 8.75000 9.91281 
Dominican Republic 2003 39.43 -2.5 0.02 -0.182 1.7975 0.3097 1.68 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.59143 8.63646 9.72207 
Ecuador 2003 335.89 -31.35 4.59 1.5368 -0.798 0.5678 1.68 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 4.96244 8.72476 10.00000 
Egypt 2003 1405.2 0.42 5.80 0.3207 -1.007 1.2200 1.47 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 8.55466 8.83386 9.83651 
France 2003 16984 281.34 336.18 13.24 28.316 0.8043 0.815 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 8.74068 8.82064 9.83651 
Germany 2003 24014 78.29 435.53 16.599 45.029 0.8757 1.84 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 9.34549 8.93169 8.60763 
Honduras 2003 129.01 -15.91 1.02 0.6168 -50.5 0.3826 1.89 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 9.45660 8.93824 8.59183 
Hong Kong SAR 2003 4566.1 -22.27 14.26 7.7107 6.2341 1.7110 2.1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9.33458 8.90149 8.83379 
India 2003 1524.7 8.56 97.10 3.2107 6.0629 1.5721 1.47 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 9.14518 9.22189 8.40872 
Ireland 2003 19842 65.08 32.18 15.744 18.23 0.7103 0.945 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 9.19301 9.26195 8.93188 
Israel 2003 2496.5 -6.25 14.89 8.1322 -7.571 1.2382 1.63 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 9.31175 9.28080 8.93188 
Italy 2003 4312.9 1048.13 283.52 11.033 15.327 0.9416 0.735 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 6.05368 6.35450 8.59284 
Japan 2003 5284.3 43.69 577.75 16.934 97.959 1.4226 1.05 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 6.07473 6.31722 8.59284 
Korea 2003 3696.8 183.86 96.96 7.5868 -56.02 1.4568 1.26 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 6.90444 6.30966 8.59284 
Malaysia 2003 1447.2 -2.31 15.61 3.595 -3.971 2.0011 1.68 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 6.78474 6.41942 8.59284 
Mexico 2003 12372 428.39 70.75 2.281 117.96 0.3955 1.47 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 7.11914 6.45744 8.89373 
Netherlands 2003 61218 6638.38 100.28 16.041 -98.11 0.8077 1.42 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 7.26528 6.76068 8.73569 
Norway 2003 2735.5 6.04 38.07 23.529 -3.421 0.8132 0.735 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 7.26528 6.83694 8.72207 
Philippines 2003 1678.4 72.83 9.88 1.3388 5.9258 1.7978 1.47 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 7.27326 6.92734 8.72207 
Poland 2003 1039.5 65.68 30.79 3.2231 -6.623 0.9364 0.735 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 7.28965 6.89442 8.72207 
Russia 2003 1614.4 49.98 82.30 2.7521 7.5722 1.0200 1.575 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4.96936 6.45899 8.30200 
Singapore 2003 10799 4.1 12.35 6.6446 8.3296 2.0284 2.1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 4.75898 5.85899 8.30200 
South Africa 2003 946.14 20.21 42.52 4.7355 -7.334 1.7025 0.945 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.65000 6.19841 7.77929 
Spain 2003 11098 209.21 178.75 9.0868 3.0234 0.7939 2.05 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 4.84444 6.00948 7.65123 
Switzerland 2003 34109 8.76 54.31 23.69 5.4107 0.8610 1.68 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4.75992 6.10263 7.22888 
Taiwan 2003 3969.2 12.53 36.67 8.0083 23.158 1.6504 1.47 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4.93247 8.08617 7.22888 
Thailand 2003 744.54 -27.6 21.81 1.7107 -9.785 1.8448 1.26 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 4.93247 8.08617 7.22888 
United Kingdom 2003 81364 873.59 303.31 16.264 30.804 0.7697 1.05 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 5.29410 8.08617 7.22888 
Venezuela 2003 1587.9 83.84 4.56 2.281 -16.67 0.4323 0.97 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 5.10774 7.83617 7.22888 
Australia 2004 23785 407.45 115.68 27.778 -5.992 2.0781 0.63 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.34739 8.39393 4.20170 
Belgium 2004 20182 104.04 57.27 21.37 6.4853 0.8112 0.21 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 5.51329 8.39393 4.20170 
Brazil 2004 6138.1 948.68 113.81 12.883 11.327 0.8862 1.155 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 7.61580 8.60013 4.20170 
Canada 2004 66448 -310.56 153.49 26.256 239.64 0.0958 1.05 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 7.27918 8.80365 4.20170 
China 2004 8719.8 -29.12 318.03 -0.439 -5.842 1.4542 1.26 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 7.39906 8.80365 4.20170 
Colombia 2004 800.33 51.81 22.23 2.5586 -148.1 0.4991 1.155 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 7.47759 9.00000 6.94005 
Costa Rica 2004 2023.4 61.37 2.32 2.183 -2.399 0.4300 1.47 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 7.47759 9.00000 7.00545 
Dominican Republic 2004 383.36 15.77 2.75 1.2424 1.8938 0.3097 1.68 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 7.54152 9.00000 6.80654 
Ecuador 2004 110.75 4.2 5.08 1.5801 0.707 0.5678 1.68 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 7.58267 9.00000 6.23161 
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Egypt 2004 1742 4.42 6.77 0.3505 -2.1 1.2200 1.47 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4.26263 6.03902 3.90000 
France 2004 22888 672.53 316.75 18.694 30.592 0.8043 0.42 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 4.30883 6.25421 4.00000 
Germany 2004 22380 605.16 402.52 23.505 52.297 0.8757 1.05 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 4.67729 6.94885 6.60000 
Honduras 2004 540.12 -8.53 1.16 0.6471 -57.4 0.3826 1.89 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.64951 6.69820 6.60000 
Hong Kong SAR 2004 3958.5 8.48 19.73 -1.607 6.4383 1.7110 2.1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.82729 6.96456 7.00000 
India 2004 3812.3 0.77 110.87 4.5215 8.2141 1.5721 -0.53 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4.86570 7.52485 7.30000 
Ireland 2004 25030 -13.78 30.65 29.073 18.908 0.7103 0.945 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4.78997 7.74206 7.32425 
Israel 2004 625.2 31.13 16.05 8.6198 -7.132 1.2382 0.84 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4.82927 7.50486 7.36785 
Italy 2004 6941.3 -559.38 267.54 14.595 16.602 0.9416 0.735 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 3.52713 7.10648 4.63964 
Japan 2004 25348 105.53 622.54 14.296 107.61 1.4226 1.05 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3.58644 6.90543 4.63964 
Korea 2004 7427.2 92.92 105.80 15.659 -56.38 1.4568 1.26 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4.86910 7.62534 4.63964 
Malaysia 2004 3334 43.69 18.72 2.1758 -8.294 2.0011 1.68 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 4.92465 7.52572 4.19619 
Mexico 2004 18472 517.14 101.45 2.3191 133.64 0.3955 1.47 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 5.35164 7.58457 4.19619 
Netherlands 2004 72155 -780.46 91.21 16.654 -110.7 0.8077 0.63 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 6.48564 8.05189 4.47139 
Norway 2004 2557.3 -15.75 40.23 28.486 -3.327 0.8132 0.735 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 6.48564 7.98535 4.19074 
Philippines 2004 1127.9 -67.71 12.34 1.2634 3.9948 1.7978 1.47 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 6.17043 8.05038 4.19619 
Poland 2004 3794.2 240.48 40.86 7.1749 -5.396 0.9364 0.735 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 6.30232 7.91096 4.08174 
Russia 2004 4104.3 159.98 128.21 9.547 10.452 1.0200 1.575 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 6.48482 6.87707 6.81199 
Singapore 2004 20744 -2.48 18.46 7.3035 5.9762 2.0284 2.1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 6.40190 6.87707 6.81199 
South Africa 2004 1084.8 16.41 43.93 18.685 -6.198 1.7025 0.945 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8.05486 7.64024 6.81199 
Spain 2004 15925 176.46 173.43 21.566 2.6538 0.7939 1.26 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 8.33264 7.64024 6.64850 
Switzerland 2004 48518 162.54 52.60 23.93 5.8211 0.8610 1.68 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 8.58419 7.64024 5.12534 
Taiwan 2004 3702.9 29.06 46.57 5.3737 25.438 1.6504 1.47 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 8.46843 8.91252 5.10354 
Thailand 2004 2059.1 23.84 24.17 1.6643 -9.774 1.8448 2.26 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 8.46843 8.91252 5.10354 
United Kingdom 2004 111392 3531.49 366.75 28.015 32.386 0.7697 0.55 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 8.40557 8.91252 5.10354 
Venezuela 2004 2443 -298.78 23.89 5.6191 -11.64 0.4323 2.365 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 8.18772 8.91252 5.10354 
Australia 2005 26643 183.93 101.34 15.666 -12.35 2.0781 1.63 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.20447 6.53031 7.68147 
Belgium 2005 16252 -55.4 42.17 17.934 7.2226 0.8112 0.21 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 4.25724 6.53031 7.30245 
Brazil 2005 7588.9 327.68 176.69 4.5465 14.147 0.8862 1.155 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 4.46618 7.49685 7.30245 
Canada 2005 62041 489.41 164.67 15.572 271.08 0.0958 2.05 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 4.60507 7.49685 7.29809 
China 2005 5099.4 95.48 346.01 2.415 14.067 1.4542 1.26 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4.83898 7.49685 7.29809 
Colombia 2005 1929.1 27 25.26 2.163 -183.5 0.4991 1.155 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 4.84018 9.25000 7.10354 
Costa Rica 2005 -524.7 72.98 2.43 2.2767 -3.576 0.4300 3.47 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.84018 9.25000 7.10354 
Dominican Republic 2005 2.88 16.45 8.13 3.9567 1.9056 0.3097 1.68 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.28282 9.25000 7.10354 
Ecuador 2005 245.01 4.2 5.23 1.5939 2.1218 0.5678 1.68 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 4.02289 9.25000 7.10354 
Egypt 2005 1899.5 3.26 12.95 0.763 -2.458 1.2200 4.47 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 6.60491 5.99139 8.44687 
France 2005 10472 -25.85 233.49 14.385 32.19 0.8043 0.42 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 6.59102 5.98281 8.32970 
Germany 2005 37694 83.6 275.01 18.05 58.016 0.8757 2.05 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 7.42451 5.79825 8.44687 
Honduras 2005 224.55 -1.63 1.28 0.712 -63.2 0.3826 1.39 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 7.64673 5.92781 8.40327 
Hong Kong SAR 2005 10554 -0.21 21.51 5.754 5.9298 1.7110 2.1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7.63620 5.92781 8.40327 
India 2005 1112.2 15.3 125.39 3.486 11.78 1.5721 3.05 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 7.67298 9.20947 8.40327 
Ireland 2005 -2424 143.3 25.82 18.543 19.242 0.7103 0.945 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 7.64339 9.20947 8.40327 
Israel 2005 3102.9 34.33 15.56 8.2346 -5.869 1.2382 0.84 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 7.57155 8.95947 8.40327 
Italy 2005 4632.6 193.21 186.88 11.781 17.713 0.9416 2.235 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 4.80290 8.16295 7.92204 
Japan 2005 25081 9.18 401.04 16.38 113.51 1.4226 1.05 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4.68629 8.16295 7.92204 
Korea 2005 5739.9 204.09 130.00 9.282 -65.24 1.4568 1.26 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5.72988 8.36295 7.92204 
Malaysia 2005 4058.9 6.35 18.39 3.297 -0.902 2.0011 1.68 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 5.89655 8.36295 7.92204 
Mexico 2005 23614 1049.63 116.15 2.289 143.5 0.3955 0.47 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 5.80704 8.36295 7.92204 
Netherlands 2005 66892 1641.27 71.95 16.17 -119.5 0.8077 0.63 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 6.07067 9.85723 7.92204 
Norway 2005 1825.1 0.84 46.27 24.57 -4.965 0.8132 2.735 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 6.07067 9.85723 7.92204 
Philippines 2005 1643 42.09 14.48 1.323 3.8971 1.7978 1.47 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 5.97807 9.85723 7.92204 
Poland 2005 -157.2 -215.13 49.59 4.053 -5.359 0.9364 0.735 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 5.80525 9.85723 7.92204 
Russia 2005 4553.5 5.08 143.21 4.179 13.767 1.0200 1.575 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5.19206 9.42402 2.78696 
Singapore 2005 28140 -3.53 16.99 6.783 3.0178 2.0284 2.1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 5.18592 9.41110 4.16844 
South Africa 2005 877.73 -5.07 34.49 7.665 -6.051 1.7025 0.945 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6.40955 9.26038 4.16844 
Spain 2005 11954 99.32 141.49 11.708 3.965 0.7939 0.76 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 6.46511 9.16414 3.72207 
Switzerland 2005 4477.9 39.82 38.62 23.741 6.1943 0.8610 1.68 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 6.55501 9.27208 3.99183 
Taiwan 2005 3952.1 1.37 44.33 7.455 24.556 1.6504 1.47 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 6.67264 9.48931 4.54768 
Thailand 2005 4327.8 19.67 22.69 1.701 -7.623 1.8448 0.47 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 6.67264 9.50000 3.75204 
United Kingdom 2005 90484 945.76 245.56 18.732 35.32 0.7697 0.945 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 6.61980 9.50000 3.97003 
Venezuela 2005 1737.9 5.22 26.51 2.982 -6.338 0.4323 -0.43 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 6.69976 9.50000 3.91826 
Australia 2006 7853.5 415.18 85.67 15.666 -18.64 2.0781 2.34 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.78551 8.05720 4.76180 
 52 
 
Belgium 2006 12910 106.09 42.92 17.934 7.9243 0.8112 0.21 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 3.98274 8.65720 4.76180 
Brazil 2006 9107.2 253.99 174.98 4.5465 14.986 0.8862 1.155 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 4.84358 9.01028 4.76180 
Canada 2006 21984 850.78 167.02 15.572 281.61 0.0958 1.26 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 5.01025 9.01028 4.31063 
China 2006 11436 83.42 414.42 2.415 48.848 1.4542 1.26 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5.25716 8.81028 4.59946 
Colombia 2006 408.32 16.26 19.34 2.163 -218.1 0.4991 0.655 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 4.85833 9.25000 5.11172 
Costa Rica 2006 842.58 65.22 2.95 2.8891 -3.476 0.4300 1.89 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.85833 9.25000 5.42779 
Dominican Republic 2006 145.15 15.92 3.89 1.7884 1.4955 0.3097 0.18 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.91488 9.50000 5.48774 
Ecuador 2006 160.61 14.2 5.46 1.7015 3.5133 0.5678 1.68 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 4.92668 9.25000 5.66757 
Egypt 2006 1238.8 5.68 16.21 0.988 -3.208 1.2200 2.1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 6.05598 8.01158 9.20981 
France 2006 15192 692.5 240.91 14.385 35.147 0.8043 0.42 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 5.72521 8.01158 9.18148 
Germany 2006 14246 220.64 300.87 18.05 59.821 0.8757 1.26 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 5.71618 8.01158 9.18148 
Honduras 2006 215.41 3.16 1.39 0.7987 -66.66 0.3826 1.785 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.66062 7.89323 9.12807 
Hong Kong SAR 2006 10868 4.79 21.03 5.754 5.0099 1.7110 2.1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.70556 7.96637 9.24523 
India 2006 4088 19.19 117.41 3.486 15.553 1.5721 1.47 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5.95203 8.75463 9.28883 
Indonesia 2006 2687.6 -10.54 62.63 1.323 -3.822 2.1342 1.26 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 5.95203 8.90239 9.29428 
Ireland 2006 42785 40.66 27.18 18.543 17.92 0.7103 0.945 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 5.85982 8.89269 9.66778 
Israel 2006 2865.4 32.32 17.00 8.2346 -3.369 1.2382 0.84 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5.92643 8.90715 9.66778 
Italy 2006 6057.9 129.46 192.36 11.781 17.513 0.9416 1.55 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 4.19726 7.14942 4.49909 
Japan 2006 20300 13.73 293.68 16.38 122.38 1.4226 1.05 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4.26961 7.86371 4.30080 
Korea 2006 11689 295.62 123.96 9.282 -71.26 1.4568 1.26 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 6.39914 8.07116 5.04360 
Malaysia 2006 2418.4 12.14 21.01 3.297 0.3483 2.0011 1.68 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 6.56580 7.96813 4.94823 
Mexico 2006 24752 405.9 122.47 2.289 169.39 0.3955 1.26 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 6.38948 7.95700 4.94823 
Norway 2006 2925.9 -0.16 42.60 24.57 -6.615 0.8132 1.155 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 6.56395 8.78525 4.96458 
Philippines 2006 1795.6 51.24 18.10 1.323 4.0969 1.7978 1.47 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 6.60947 9.01279 5.28065 
Poland 2006 2529.8 345.57 44.22 4.053 -5.406 0.9364 0.735 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 6.51661 8.74755 5.23978 
Russia 2006 3974.2 208.8 175.39 4.179 18.049 1.0200 1.575 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4.49601 4.27692 6.56271 
Singapore 2006 21531 -3.58 20.37 6.783 2.1037 2.0284 2.1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 4.46934 5.06253 6.27911 
South Africa 2006 844.49 -8.59 27.91 7.665 -6.536 1.7025 0.945 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.88178 6.83683 6.27911 
Spain 2006 9700.4 105.07 146.81 11.708 3.8527 0.7939 1.155 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 6.07622 6.63683 5.93188 
Switzerland 2006 22475 38.92 40.78 23.741 6.505 0.8610 1.68 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 5.91767 7.03683 6.73297 
Taiwan 2006 5657.8 22.38 36.58 7.455 26.97 1.6504 1.47 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5.98226 8.00000 7.04905 
Thailand 2006 2542.9 126.61 29.99 1.701 -7.721 1.8448 2.26 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 5.98226 8.25000 7.07902 
United Kingdom 2006 128663 1589.71 274.30 18.732 35.765 0.7697 0.945 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 6.22373 8.00000 6.20436 
Venezuela 2006 3864.1 78.7 31.34 2.982 -5.141 0.4323 1.655 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 6.07426 7.50000 6.36240 
Australia 2007 30902 446.3 152.96 11.066 -20.72 2.0781 1.155 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.52194 8.26712 9.23181 
Belgium 2007 21520 392.27 65.09 16.384 8.4753 0.8112 0.21 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 5.55169 8.26712 8.80061 
Brazil 2007 22339 -47.66 236.57 6.0965 13.572 0.8862 1.155 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 7.54931 8.26712 8.80061 
Canada 2007 88586 2024.58 187.03 6.3215 296.8 0.0958 0.26 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 7.54931 8.26712 8.61580 
China 2007 8807.4 227.21 622.77 6.015 70.968 1.4542 1.26 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 7.68470 8.26712 8.73025 
Colombia 2007 1550.8 91 38.61 7.063 -244.5 0.4991 1.55 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 7.65347 9.75000 9.17166 
Costa Rica 2007 604.05 -1.11 3.88 3.6154 -3.511 0.4300 1.89 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 7.65347 9.75000 9.17166 
Dominican Republic 2007 88.69 18.97 5.82 2.5751 1.1018 0.3097 1.365 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 7.69134 9.75000 9.23978 
Ecuador 2007 292.84 4.3 5.65 1.6401 2.8046 0.5678 1.68 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 7.73805 9.75000 10.00000 
Egypt 2007 2627.4 -5.48 20.85 7.4415 -2.47 1.2200 2.1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5.47105 8.41538 8.62478 
France 2007 24403 4517.8 364.08 14.685 39.675 0.8043 3.92 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 5.44427 8.54605 8.92011 
Germany 2007 26641 124.81 469.26 12.15 61.337 0.8757 0.26 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 5.98473 8.71485 8.92011 
Honduras 2007 -56.56 -1 1.70 0.919 -70.48 0.3826 1.785 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 6.04029 8.56816 8.80381 
Hong Kong SAR 2007 9407.6 3.84 25.66 12.054 3.9354 1.7110 2.1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6.05348 8.63196 8.72207 
India 2007 6922.7 15.5 200.28 1.886 18.523 1.5721 2.47 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 6.06293 9.46657 8.68937 
Indonesia 2007 7485.6 -12.9 65.93 0.823 -4.717 2.1342 1.26 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 6.06293 9.50000 8.58311 
Ireland 2007 49474 26.35 38.00 14.343 19.147 0.7103 0.945 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 6.09777 9.50000 8.62350 
Israel 2007 2244.3 39.05 23.71 8.7222 -3.257 1.2382 0.84 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 6.08835 9.43575 8.45777 
Italy 2007 8122.4 195.22 292.87 19.381 18.6 0.9416 0.155 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 3.91726 8.80570 5.76175 
Japan 2007 18526 113.22 408.24 12.38 117.79 1.4226 1.05 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5.04246 8.84724 5.76175 
Korea 2007 1991.8 302.27 134.05 -4.618 -67.35 1.4568 1.26 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5.14030 8.62366 5.88011 
Malaysia 2007 3303.9 6.19 28.75 1.897 -4.946 2.0011 1.68 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 5.19585 8.62366 6.09264 
Mexico 2007 25504 773.1 127.37 -0.811 184.94 0.3955 1.26 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 5.42968 8.59803 6.09264 
Philippines 2007 1464.1 65.65 24.21 1.223 3.6272 1.7978 1.47 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 5.29520 9.50000 5.77929 
Poland 2007 10136 401.57 71.38 6.153 -5.206 0.9364 1.235 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 5.13828 9.25144 5.51771 
Singapore 2007 28845 2.58 28.65 1.283 3.1354 2.0284 2.1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 5.72106 8.82731 6.11172 
South Africa 2007 2095.8 0.68 35.77 -3.135 -5.477 1.7025 1.945 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7.52136 9.02703 6.53951 
Spain 2007 22102 268.13 213.05 11.108 3.3454 0.7939 0.655 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 7.57691 8.97826 6.53951 
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Switzerland 2007 14078 21.39 56.45 24.341 6.4667 0.8610 1.68 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 7.52031 8.96968 6.53951 
Taiwan 2007 2377.8 18.64 42.60 1.455 26.617 1.6504 0.47 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 7.60596 8.96882 6.41689 
Thailand 2007 1876.8 -8.61 38.10 4.401 -7.485 1.8448 1.47 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 7.60596 9.00000 6.74067 
United Kingdom 2007 105334 2151.34 399.09 -1.468 38.881 0.7697 0.945 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 7.85577 9.00000 6.44959 
Venezuela 2007 4242.6 330.14 37.39 8.882 -5.008 0.4323 1.26 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 7.87568 9.00000 6.44959 
Australia 2008 26047 1180.37 122.60 14.7 -20.94 2.0781 1.155 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.50959 6.68046 9.20981 
Belgium 2008 15911 512.99 57.11 17.609 8.9429 0.8112 0.21 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 4.90575 6.68046 9.01362 
Brazil 2008 5395.5 541.21 232.55 4.872 16.78 0.8862 2.155 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 4.46062 6.68046 9.07629 
Canada 2008 48476 987.53 145.89 13.629 315.43 0.0958 1.05 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 4.40507 6.68046 9.07629 
China 2008 30456 2223.24 736.87 3.171 69.574 1.4542 1.26 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4.39626 6.68046 9.07629 
Colombia 2008 1431.9 13.7 27.73 3.192 -253.7 0.4991 1.155 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 4.34096 9.00000 9.07629 
Costa Rica 2008 623.07 -39.56 3.64 3.9623 -6.406 0.4300 0.89 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.34096 9.00000 9.07629 
Ecuador 2008 302.47 18.88 7.48 2.5814 5.9059 0.5678 1.68 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 4.35876 9.00000 9.07629 
Egypt 2008 2255.8 23.84 24.68 2.121 -4.778 1.2200 2.1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 6.30133 7.04200 9.60223 
France 2008 25808 1002.45 316.24 14.448 42.177 0.8043 0.655 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 6.55358 7.01852 9.34670 
Germany 2008 28358 261.46 399.41 16.811 62.698 0.8757 1.05 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 7.17120 7.00296 9.34670 
Honduras 2008 314.46 9.79 1.63 1.0428 -72.98 0.3826 1.285 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 7.14342 7.20711 9.50136 
Hong Kong SAR 2008 7873.2 12.47 19.78 7.077 3.2908 1.7110 2.1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7.20071 7.20711 9.10627 
India 2008 6802.6 -56.45 133.99 3.15 20.583 1.5721 1.68 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 7.09390 9.00000 8.78747 
Indonesia 2008 4440.4 5.95 69.36 1.218 -4.507 2.1342 1.26 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 7.09390 9.00000 9.60490 
Ireland 2008 57142 93.52 22.21 17.661 18.865 0.7103 0.945 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 7.26621 9.00000 9.43597 
Israel 2008 1949.3 43.62 28.64 8.337 -2.428 1.2382 1.84 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 7.27701 9.00000 9.32698 
Italy 2008 5372.4 98.73 249.44 13.377 18.49 0.9416 0.945 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 6.92479 9.19064 6.30699 
Japan 2008 32476 26.97 566.88 15.54 110.72 1.4226 1.05 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 7.08220 9.19064 6.30699 
Korea 2008 3815.2 57.04 27.53 6.363 -61.95 1.4568 1.26 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 8.36563 8.95477 6.30699 
Malaysia 2008 2652.4 229.77 30.72 3.003 -7.238 2.0011 1.68 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 8.47674 8.74465 6.16349 
Mexico 2008 15517 257.35 106.78 1.638 191.66 0.3955 1.26 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 8.45127 8.78266 6.24251 
Philippines 2008 12.13 -83.84 22.58 1.302 2.9344 1.7978 1.47 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 7.92901 9.32155 6.41417 
Poland 2008 153.94 399.1 80.24 4.494 -4.297 0.9364 2.34 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 7.98405 8.96200 6.28065 
Singapore 2008 9281.1 0.21 19.20 5.628 -5.274 2.0284 2.1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 3.78223 7.76219 7.74053 
South Africa 2008 859.4 14.47 17.46 5.397 -2.601 1.7025 0.155 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.33889 7.82397 7.74053 
Spain 2008 5930.5 277.05 183.27 11.582 3.235 0.7939 2.05 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 3.14000 6.55838 6.51226 
Switzerland 2008 58429 32.87 65.01 23.867 9.0177 0.8610 1.68 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3.21406 7.96365 6.05450 
Taiwan 2008 5565.5 14.85 33.63 6.195 22.278 1.6504 0.26 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3.05697 9.00000 5.77384 
Thailand 2008 1037.6 48.57 30.75 2.268 -5.159 1.8448 1.47 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 3.05697 9.00000 5.77384 
United Kingdom 2008 111590 838.14 156.93 14.49 39.992 0.7697 -0.06 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2.99373 9.00000 5.77384 
Venezuela 2008 3376.9 383.56 55.93 4.221 5.1396 0.4323 3.26 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 3.13739 8.25000 5.77384 
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